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Equal Protection for Illegitimate Children: A 
Consistent Rule Emerges 
In Trimble u. Gordon,' the Supreme Court struck down a 
section of the Illinois Probate Acta that allowed illegitimate chil- 
dren to inherit by intestate succession from only their mothers. 
Many observers felt the Trimble opinion resolved the confusion 
over the standard of equal protection analysis applicable to 
cases involving classifications based on legitimacy.' The general 
consensus among observers was that "the test applied by the 
Trimble Court is remarkably close to strictest scrutiny, for it 
would be difficult to imagine a more exacting analysis of the re- 
lationship between statutory purposes and legislative means 
than the one engaged in by the majority."' One commentator 
proposed that "the Trimble decision clearly justifies a general 
condemnation of classifications based on legitimacy? Another 
predicted that "the momentum amassed since 1968 for equal 
treatment should work to erase all distinctions based upon 
legitima~y."~ 
These predictions proved to be inaccurate. Just one year 
after deciding Trimble, the Supreme Court upheld two states' 
statutes that discriminated on the basis of illegitimacy. In Lalli 
1. 430 U.S. 762 (1977). 
2. Probate Act of 1975 8 2-2, ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 3, $ 2-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 
1978) (original version at Probate Act of 1939 § 12, 1939 Ill. Laws 8). 
3. "[Tlhe general spirit of Trimble . . . [indicates that] any statute which denies 
rights to illegitimates who are able to prove paternity should be stricken." Note, Pater- 
nal Inheritance Rights of Illegitimate Children and the Problem of Proving Paternity, 
24 WAYNE L. REV. 1389, 1405 (1978). "While the [Trimble] opinion falls short of calling 
illegitimacy a suspect category . . . , it implies that the scrutiny which will be applied to 
illegitimacy is almost indistinguishable from strict scrutiny." Comment, Paternity Stat- 
utes: Thwarting Equal Protection for Illegitimates, 32 U. MIAMI L. REV. 339, 365-66 
(1977) [hereinafter cited as Paternity Statutes]. "In Trimble, the Court implemented 
the reasonably strict scrutiny test." 11 CREIGHTON L. REV. 609, 628 (1977). "Therefore, in 
the Court's rejection of the statutory scheme, its analysis approximated strict scrutiny 
. . . ." 52 TUL. L. REV. 406, 412 (1978). 
4. 43 VILL. L. REV. 405, 415 (1978). 
5. Comment, Constitutional Law: Equal Protection for Illegitimates, 17 WASHBURN 
L.J. 392, 399 (1978). 
6. Note, Paternal Inheritance Rights of Illegitimate Children and the Problem of 
Proving Paternity, 24 WAYNE L. REV. 1389, 1408 (1978). 
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v. Lalli,' the Court sustained a New York law8 prohibiting an 
illegitimate child from inheriting from his intestate father unless 
the father during his lifetime declared paternity. Similarly, the 
Georgia law9 upheld in Parham v. Hughes1° denied the father of 
an illegitimate child the right to sue for the wrongful death of 
the child unless the father legitimated the child prior to the 
child's death." 
The statute declared unconstitutional in Trimble was sub- 
stantively similar to the statute upheld in Lalli.12 By contrast, 
the standards of equal protection analysis that were applied 
were markedly different. In Trimble the Court maintained that 
even " '[tlhough the latitude given state economic and social 
regulation is necessarily broad, when state statutory classifica- 
tions approach sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this 
Court exercises a stricter scrutiny . . . .' "I3 The Trimble Court 
also required that the statute be " 'carefully tuned to alternative 
considerations.' "I4 
Compare the Trimble approach with the test used in Lalli: 
"[Ilt is not the function of a court 'to hypothesi~e independently 
on the desirability or feasibility of any possible alternative[s]' to 
7. 439 US. 259 (1978). 
8. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW $ 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967). 
9. GA. CODE ANN. $ 105-1307 (1975). 
10. 441 US. 347 (1979). 
11. The Georgia Code provides that a natural father can legitimate his child merely 
by petitioning the superior court in his county to declare paternity. The court then issues 
an order declaring the child to be legitimate and capable of inheriting from the father 
equally with any children born in lawful wedlock. GA. CODE ANN. 5 74-103 (1975). 
12. The New York law reads in pertinent part: 
(1) An illegitimate child . . . and his issue inherit from his mother . . . . 
(2) An illegitimate child is the legitimate child of his father so that he 
and his issue inherit from his father if a court of competent jurisdiction has, 
during the lifetime of the father, made an order of filiation declaring paternity 
in a proceeding instituted during the pregnancy of the mother or within two 
years from the birth of the child. 
N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW $ 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967). 
The relevant part of the Illinois law declares: "An illegitimate child is heir of his 
mother . . . . A child who was illegitimate whose parents inter-marry and who is ac- 
knowledged by the father as the father's child is legitimate." Probate Act of 1975 § 2-2, 
ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 3, $ 2-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1978) (original version at Probate 
Act of 1939 $ 12, 1939 Ill. Laws 8). 
Although specific requirements differ, both statutes require that in order for illegiti- 
mate children to inherit they must be formally legitimated by acts of the parents prior to 
the death of the father. See note 88 infra. 
13. 430 US. at 767 (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 US. 164, 172 
(1972)). 
14. Id. at 772 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 US. 495, 513 (1976)). 
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the statutory scheme . . . ."I6 Instead of the "stricter scrutiny" 
applied in Trimble, the Lalli opinion declared that state statutes 
regarding illegitimacy must be only "substantially related to the 
important state interests the statute is intended to promote."16 
This apparent inconsistency is the latest chapter in the Su- 
preme Court's struggle to determine the appropriate constitu- 
tional test for statutes dealing with illegitimacy. The lack of a 
consistent test is not only philosophically distressing, but on a 
practical level, it offers states little guidance in determining 
whether their laws are valid. Although Justice Blackmun con- 
curred in the Lalli result, he strongly criticized the plurality 
opinion for not providing clear guidance to the states: "[Tlhe 
corresponding statutes of other States will be of questionable va- 
lidity until this Court passes on them, one by one, as being on 
the Trimble side of the line or the Labine-Lalli side."17 
The Supreme Court opinions dealing with illegitimacy can 
be justly criticized for inconsistency; however, the purpose of 
this Comment is to propose a rule that accurately explains the 
holdings of the illegitimacy cases. Briefly stated, this rule is that 
the degree of judicial scrutiny in illegitimacy cases depends on 
the legislative purpose for the discrimination. If the statute's 
primary purpose is to express society's condemnation of promis- 
cuity, then the statute will be strictly scrutinized and will proba- 
bly be held unconstitutional. On the other hand, if the discrimi- 
nation serves a purely administrative purpose, unrelated to 
moral condemnation of illegitimacy, the statutory scheme has a 
much greater chance of being held constitutional. 
The fourteenth amendment provides: "No State shall . . . 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
the laws."18 The drafters of the fourteenth amendment chose to 
express the constitutional guarantee of equal protection in broad 
terms. The language of the amendment itself does not, for exam- 
ple readily indicate whether illegitimate children can be treated 
differently than legitimate children. In fact, the language of the 
fourteenth amendment alone does not resolve any of the myriad 
15. 439 U.S. at 274 (quoting Mathews v. Lucas, 427 US. 495, 515 (1976)). 
16. Id. at 275-76. 
17. Id. at 277 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
18. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, $ 1. 
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issues that have been raised pursuant to the promise of equality 
before the law. In order to give real meaning to the amendment's 
promises the courts have had to develop formulas and tests that 
define "equal protection" in a way that can be applied to specific 
factual situations. By the late 1960's a fairly rigid standard had 
evolved. l9 
This standard involves a "two-tiered" analysis of the chal- 
lenged law. The first tier, or the general rule, is that a state stat- 
ute that discriminates between people or groups of people will 
be upheld if there is some rational basis to support the discrimi- 
nation." The impact of this test is to give the states great defer- 
ence in fashioning laws-even if such laws treat people un- 
equally-so long as a minimal connection exists between the 
purpose of the law and the discrimination. 
The second tier consists of two exceptions to the rational 
basis test. The rational basis test applies unless the law discrimi- 
nates on the basis of a "suspect category,"" or unless the law 
infringes some "fundamental right."22 Under either exception 
19. For a detailed review of equal protection analysis and especially the two-tiered 
system, see L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 991-1100 (1978). Developments in 
this area are reported in Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Foreword: In Search 
of Evolving Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 
HARV. L. REV. 1 (1972). 
20. The rational basis test has been stated many times by the Supreme Court. One 
widely quoted elucidation of this test is from McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 
(1961): 
Id. 
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification rests on 
grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective. State 
legislatures are presumed to have acted within their constitutional power de- 
spite the fact that, in practice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory 
discrimination will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be 
conceived to justify it. 
it 425-26. 
21. The Supreme Court has to date declared three categories suspect. See Graham 
v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971) (alienage); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) 
(race); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948) (national origin or ancestry). Although 
many of the racial discrimination cases also involve discrimination based on national 
origin or ancestry, national origin has been declared a suspect classification even in the 
absence of racial overtones. See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948). See also Hira- 
bayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 1.00 (1943). The classification of alienage as a 
suspect category has been weakened by recent cases. See Foley v. Connelie, 435 U.S. 291 
(1978); Ambach v. Norwick, 441 U.S. 68 (1979). 
In Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 US. 677 (1973), the Supreme Court in a plurality 
opinion declared sex to be a suspect category. Frontiero has not been followed, however, 
and the more recent decisions have firmly rejected, for the time being, classifying sex as 
a suspect category. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). 
22. The Supreme Court has deemed various rights fundamental for equal protection 
purposes. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (the right to an abortion in the first 
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the states are denied the deference afforded them under the ra- 
tional basis test and strict judicial scrutiny is imposed. This 
means that a state has to show more than a r~asonable connec- 
tion between the statute's purpose and the challenged discrimi- 
nation; the state has the burden of proving that the statute 
"promote[s] a compelling governmental interest."aa 
This two-tiered approach has the advantages of being both 
understandable and relatively easy to apply. It can, however, be 
criticized for being too rigid? Under the two-tiered approach it 
is clear that whether an individual case is won or lost usually 
depends on which tier is used. The facts of the case and the 
strengths of the parties' interests are important only to the ex- 
tent that they determine which tier applies. In recent years the 
Supreme Court has not adhered to the two-tiered mode of anal- 
ysis as dogmatically as had been the custom.2s Several observers 
have noted the Court's changing approach and have termed the 
new standard a balancing test or a sliding scale appr~ach.'~ The 
two-tiered analysis was basically an "either-or" approach: either 
the statute was strictly scrutinized or it was barely scrutinized. 
The balancing test or sliding scale approach, however, facilitates 
varying degrees of judicial scrutiny, and therefore allows varying 
trimester of pregnancy); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969) (the right of inter- 
state travel); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (the right to marry); Harper v. Vir- 
ginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966) (the right to vote); Griswold v. Connecticut, 
381 US. 479 (1965) (the right of privacy in marital matters); Sherbet v. Verner, 374 U.S. 
398 (1963) (the free exercise of religion); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (the 
right to appeal criminal convictions); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (the 
right to procreate). 
23. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis in original). 
24. Between 1937 and 1970 (roughly from the beginning of the two-tiered approach 
until when the approach began to change) the Supreme Court applied the "rational ba- 
sis" standard to invalidate only one legislative classification. Paternity Statutes, supra 
note 3, at 344; see Morey v. Doud, 354 US. 457 (1957). Doud was overruled in New 
Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 306 (1976). 
Only once has the Supreme Court upheld the legislative classification in a case in- 
volving strict scrutiny of a suspect category. See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 
214 (1944). 
25. See Gunther, supra note 20, at 10-20. 
26. The most prominent advocate of the "sliding scale" or balancing test approach 
is Justice Marshall. He argues not only that the two-tiered approach should be aban- 
doned in favor of a more flexible approach, Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 508, 519-21 
(1970) (Marshall, J., dissenting), but also contends that the Supreme Court has not in 
fact applied a two-tiered analysis in recent years. Justice Marshall persuasively argues 
that the Court has applied varying degrees of judicial scrutiny in equal protection cases. 
See Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 US. 307, 317-22 (1976) (Marshall, 
J., dissenting); San Antonio School Dist. v. Rodriquez, 411 U.S. 1, 98-110 (1973) (Mar- 
shall, J., dissenting). 
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deference to legislative decisions. The Supreme Court's move 
from the rigid two-tiered analysis to a more flexible approach is 
amply documented by a review of the illegitimacy cases. 
A. An Uncertain Beginning 
In Levy u. Louisiana2' and its companion case, Glona v. 
American Guarantee & Liability Insurance C O . , ~ ~  the Supreme 
Court for the first time considered discrimination based on ille- 
gitimacy as a possible denial of equal protection of the laws. In 
Levy five illegitimate children tried to recover for the death of 
their mother under the Louisiana wrongful death statute? The 
Louisiana courts had construed the word "children" as used in 
the statute to exclude  illegitimate^.^^ In striking down this law 
the Supreme Court did not clearly define what test it applied. 
Justice Douglas' majority opinion paid homage to the rational 
basis rule," but also cited cases clearly involving the strict scru- 
tiny approachs2 and declared: "We have been extremely sensi- 
tive when it comes to basic civil rights . . . ."33 The companion 
case, Glona, involved a mother's right under the Louisiana 
wrongful death statutes4 to recover for an illegitimate child's 
death. As in Levy, Justice Douglas mentioned the rational basis 
standard, but the challenged law was summarily declared uncon- 
s t i t u t i ~ n a l , ~ ~  thus creating the impression that the statute was 
not afforded traditional rational basis d e f e r e n ~ e . ~ ~  Consequently, 
the Court's analysis in Levy and Glona raised doubts as to the 
27. 391 U.S. 68 'i1968). 
28. 391 U.S. 73 (1968). 
29. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1979). 
30. Levy v. State, 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (La. Ct. App. 1966), cert. denied, 250 La. 25, 
193 So. 2d 530 (1967), reu'd, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). See also Glona v. American Guarantee & 
Life Ins. Co., 391 U.S. at 74 n.3; Youchian v. Texas & P. Ry. Co., 147 La. 1080,86 So. 551 
(1920); Buie v. Hester, 147 So. 2d 733 (La. Ct. App. 1962). 
31. See 391 U.S. at  71. 
32. Id. The cases cited by the Court were Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 
U.S. 663, 669-70 (1966), Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), and Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942). 
33. 391 U.S. at 71. 
34. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2315 (West 1979). 
35. 391 U.S. at 75. 
36. See generally Wallach & Tenoso, A Vindication of the Rights of Lrnmarried 
Mothers and Their Children: An Analysis of the Institution of Illegitimacy, Equal Pro- 
tection, and the Uniform Parentage Act, 23 U. KAN. L. REV. 23, 43-44 (1974). 
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proper equal protection standard to be applied in illegitimacy 
cases. 
In a dissenting opinion applicable to both Levy and Glona, 
Justice Harlan characterized the majority opinions as "constitu- 
tional curio~ities,"~ and contended that the majority reached its 
conclusion "by a process that can only be described as brute 
force."" Justice Harlan observed that wrongful death is a legis- 
latively created cause of action in which the legislature generally 
limits those who can recover on "highly arbitrary" grounds.ss 
These grounds are usually technical legal distinctions. For exam- 
ple, a man may recover for the death of a wife he did not love 
and whom he did not support, but the same man may not re- 
cover for the death of his paramour. The legal relationship is 
considered a valid distinction here. Justice Harlan argued that 
basing recovery on whether a child is legally recognized is just as 
"rational" as basing recovery on the biological relationship, 
which appears to be what the majority required.'O 
Three years after Levy and Glona the dissenters in those 
cases found themselves in the majority in a new illegitimacy 
case. The Court in Labine v. Vineent41 upheld a Louisiana law 
that denied unacknowledged illegitimate children the right to in- 
herit under the intestate succession act and limited the right to 
recover of even acknowledged illegitimate children." In uphold- 
ing the statute by applying traditional rational basis analysis, 
the Court stated: 
[I]t is for [the Louisiana] legislature, not the life-tenured 
judges of this Court, to select from among possible laws. We 
cannot say that Louisiana's policy provides a perfect or even a 
desirable solution or the one we would have provided for the 
problem of the property rights of illegitimate children.4s 
Justice Black, writing for the majority, tried to distinguish 
Labine from Levy by limiting the holdings of Levy to tort 
actions.44 
37. 391 U.S. at 76 (Harlan, J., dissenting). 
38. Id. 
39. Id. at 77. 
40. Id. at 79-80. 
41. 401 U.S. 532 (1971). Justice Black wrote the majority opinion, joined by Chief 
Justice Burger and Justices Harlan, Stewart, and Blackmun. Justice Brennan, joined by 
Justices Douglas, White, and Marshall, dissented. 
42. LA. Crv. CODE ANN. arts. 919, 202, 206 (West 1952). 
43. 401 U.S. at 538-39. 
44. Id. at 535-36. 
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Justice Brennan's dissent in Labine countered that the ma- 
jority opinion's "reasoning flies in the face not only of the Equal 
Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amend- 
ment, but also of the very notion of a rule of law."45 The lengthy 
dissent compared illegitimacy with national origin, a suspect 
category. Justice Brennan contended that illegitimacy and an- 
cestry are things over which people have no control and there- 
fore illegitimacy statutes should be strictly scrutinized in the 
same manner as statutes involving national origin.46 Therefore, 
he concluded, "[ilt is certainly unusual in this country for a per- 
son to be legally disadvantaged on the basis of factors over 
which he never had any control."47 Despite the strength of Jus- 
tice Brennan's argument, it is nevertheless true that the govern- 
ment can and does legally discriminate against people on the ba- 
sis of facts over which they have no control. Age, for example, is 
an unalterable trait that is not classified as a suspect category 
even though it is often employed as a basis for dis~rimination.~~ 
Sex is another unalterable trait that the Supreme Court has re- 
fused to denominate a suspect categ~ry.'~ 
B. Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.: Moving Toward 
Strict Scrutiny 
When the next illegitimacy case reached the Supreme 
Court, it was uncertain whether the Court would follow the Levy 
and Glona approach of closely examining the state statute, or 
adhere to the Labine approach of granting broad deference to 
the state. In Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co.PO the Su- 
preme Court chose to follow Levyb1 and distinguish Labine," 
but the appropriate equal protection standard for illegitimacy 
remained uncertain. The Court in Weber invalidated the Louisi- 
ana workmen's compensation statuteb3 that discriminated 
45. Id. at 550 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
46. Id. at 557-58. 
47. Id. 
48. See, e.g., Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307 (1976). 
49. See Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974). 
50. 406 U.S. 164 (1972). 
51. Id. at 168-69, 172. 
52. Id. at 170-71. 
53. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. '$ 23:1021(3) (West 1964). This section defined "children" to 
include "only legitimate children, stepchildren, posthumous children, adopted children," 
and acknowledged illegitimate children. Thus, unacknowledged illegitimate children 
could only recover under workmen's compensation as "other dependents." Those quali- 
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against illegitimate children who were seeking equal benefits 
along with the legitimate children of their deceased father. 
In distinguishing Weber from Labine, Justice Powell noted 
that Labine "reflected . . . the traditional deference to a state's 
prerogative to regulate the disposition at death of property 
within its borders."64 Justice Powell reasoned that "the substan- 
tial state interest in providing for 'the stability . . . of land 
titles' "66 justified the greater deference afforded the state in 
La bine. 
Justice Powell further distinguished Labine on the ground 
that the deceased in Labine could have easily made a will pro- 
viding an inheritance for the illegitimate child, whereas the de- 
ceased in Weber could not have legitimated the plaintiffs be- 
cause of the requirement in Louisiana law that in order to 
acknowledge an illegitimate child the father must have been ca- 
pable of contracting marriage with the mother when the child 
was conceived." In other words, it would have been relatively 
easy for the illegitimate child in Labine to receive an inheri- 
tance, but in Weber it was legally impossible for the children to 
receive any benefits of the compensation scheme. According to 
Justice Powell's argument, stricter scrutiny should be applied to 
statutes that place "insurmountable barriers" in the paths of il- 
legitimate children seeking to receive equal treatment. Justice 
Powell in a later opinion, however, seemed to reverse himself on 
the insurmountable barrier doctrine and recognized that "[bly 
focusing on the steps that an intestate might have taken to as- 
sure some inheritance for his illegitimate children, the analysis 
loses sight of the essential question: the constitutionality of dis- 
crimination against illegitimates . . . . "67 
Notwithstanding the difficulty in harmonizing the Labine 
precedent, the Court in Weber did attempt a thorough doctrinal 
analysis of the equal protection standard for illegitimacy. Justice 
fying as "other dependents" received only the excess beyond the "children's" and surviv- 
ing spouse's portions. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. 5 23:1232(8) (West 1964). In Weber the illegit- 
imate children recovered nothing since the benefits awarded to the legitimate children 
and widow exhausted the funds allotted. 406 U.S. at 167. -. 
54. 406 U.S. at 170. 
55. Id. (quoting Labine v. Vincent, 229 So. 2d 449, 452 (La. Ct. App. 1969)). 
56. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 204 (West 1952). When the illegitimate children in 
Weber were born their father was legally married to a woman other than the children's 
mother. Thus their parents were incapable of marriage when they were conceived. 406 
U.S. a t  170-71. 
57. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. a t  774. 
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Powell cited the leading cases that developed both the rational 
basis test and the fundamental rights exception, and then de- 
clared: "The essential inquiry in all the foregoing cases is, how- 
ever, inevitably a dual one: What legitimate state interest does 
the classification promote? What fundamental personal rights 
might the classification endanger?"68 
Justice Powell's analysis in Weber simply incorporates both 
tiers of the old two-tiered approach. An examination of state in- 
terests or objectives is the starting point of the two-tiered analy- 
sis. The second question in the Weber "two-fold" approach ap- 
pears to represent the fundamental rights exception that the 
courts have used for many years in other ~ontexts.~@ This em- 
phasis on fundamental rights in the illegitimacy context is con- 
fusing since arguably no fundamental rights are infringed upon 
by illegitimacy statutes. The Supreme Court has not recognized 
a fundamental right to inherit in intestate succession, to sue 
under wrongful death statutes, or to receive workmen's compen- 
sation or social security benefits. Nonetheless, these areas com- 
prise the majority of alleged illegitimacy discrimination. These 
are all areas where the "right" to receive the benefit of the stat- 
ute-if it can be called a right-is created by legislation, and 
such rights are commonly refused to those who do not qualify. 
Hence, the Weber "two-fold approach" did not significantly 
clarify the appropriate equal protection standard to be applied 
in illegitimacy cases. 
Following Weber, the Court struck down several statutory 
schemes discriminating against illegitimates without explicitly 
following Weber's two-fold inquiry. In Gomez u. Perez,'O the Su- 
preme Court overruled a Texas Court of Appeals decision61 that 
granted legitimate children "a judicially enforceable right to 
support from their natural  father^,"^' but denied that same right 
to illegitimate children. The per curiam opinion cited cases hold- 
ing statutes unconstitutional for discrimination against illegiti- 
mates but ignored Labine, the one case upholding such a stat- 
58. 406 U.S. at 173. The Weber approach is discussed in several commentaries. Wal- 
lach & Tenoso, supra note 36; Note, Equal Protection and the "Middle-Tier": The Im- 
pact on Women and Illegitimates, 54 NOTRE DAME LAW. 303 (1978); Paternity Statutes, 
supra note 3, at 348; 42 Mo. L. REV. 444 (1977). 
59. See note 22 supra. 
60. 409 US.  535 (1973). 
61. Gomez v. Perez, 466 S.W.2d 41 (Tex. Ct. App. 1971). 
62. 409 U S .  at 535. 
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ute. A New Jersey financial assistance program63 encountered 
the same fate in the 1973 case of New Jersey v. C~hill.~' The 
following year a portion of the Social Security Act6' requiring 
illegitimate children to prove dependency in order to recover on 
behalf of their disabled parent was declared unconstitutional. In 
that case, Jimenez v. Weinberger,66 the Court reasoned that the 
law discriminated between classes of illegitimate children. For 
illegitimate children in general the statute required proof of ac- 
tual dependency prior to the father's disabling injury. Illegiti- 
mate children born after the injury obviously could not prove 
that they had depended on their fathers prior to the injury. Af- 
ter-born illegitimate children could only qualify for benefits if 
they were entitled to inherit under state intestacy law, were le- 
gitimated under state law, or were precluded from legitimate 
status because of some formal defect in their parents' mar- 
riage." These requirements have nothing to do with dependency 
and yet the aim of the statute was to aid dependent children, 
therefore the law discriminated on criteria unrelated to its goal. 
In other words, the Supreme Court invalidated the law because 
some after-born illegitimates could receive benefits and some 
could not, and the distinction had nothing to do with whether 
they actually depended on the injured parent." 
Following these cases Labine remained the only exception 
to the trend that statutes discriminating against illegitimate 
children would not withstand an equal protection challenge. The 
end result was that even though the Supreme Court had never 
expressly admitted it, illegitimacy was apparently being treated 
as a suspect category. 
C. Mathews v. Lucas: Is Illegitimacy a Suspect Category? 
Subsequently, in Mathews v. Lu~as , '~  the Supreme Court 
refused to in fact make illegitimacy a suspect category, even 
though the lower court had d~ne.so.~O The plaintiffs in Lucas 
63. N.J. STAT. ANN. 8 4413 (West 1940) (replaced in 1977 by N.J. STAT. ANN. 8 4410 
(West Supp. 1979-1980)). 
64. 411 U.S. 619 (1973). 
65. 42 U.S.C. 8 416(h)(3)(B) (1976). 
66. 417 US. 628 (1974). 
67. Id. at 635-36. 
68. Id. 
69. 427 U.S. 495 (1976). 
70. Id. at 504-06. 
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challenged portions of the Social Security Act that required ille- 
gitimate children to prove actual dependency on a deceased par- 
ent in order to recover after-death support.71 The plaintiffs were 
illegitimate children of the deceased and could not prove depen- 
dency. The Court refused to condemn the established procedure 
since it thought that "the statutory classifications challenged 
here are justified as reasonable empirical judgements that are 
consistent with a design to qualify entitlement to benefits upon 
a child's dependency at the time of the parent's death."?' The 
degree of scrutiny implied by this holding is certainly less than 
strict scrutiny and more akin to rational basis deferen~e.?~ 
Weber's two-fold approach was not expressly followed. In refus- 
ing to declare illegitimacy a suspect category the Court did con- 
tend that its scrutiny of illegitimacy statutes would not be "a 
toothless one."74 
Justice Stevens' dissent noted that Mathews v. Lucas 
presented essentially the same issue treated in Jimenez u. Wein- 
berger, where the Court reached an opposite resultP6 As noted, 
the problem of illegitimate children born after the parent be- 
comes disabled was crucial in Jimenez. Obviously, where the 
parent has died-as in Lucas-this problem does not exist. On 
this ground the two cases are distinguishable. The end result, 
however, is not satisfying. Certain illegitimate children of de- 
ceased parents cannot recover Social Security benefits, but simi- 
larly situated illegitimate children of disabled parents can. The 
Court offered no clear justification for this distinction. 
D. Trimble v. Gordon 
Just one year after deciding Lucas, the Supreme Court de- 
cided Trimble v. Gordon. The Court made a detailed examina- 
tion of the preceding illegitimacy cases in Trimble, and set forth 
what many observers felt would finally become a consistent 
standard for illegitimacy cases: 
71. 42 U.S.C. 33 402(d)(l), (3), 416(2)(B), (3) (1976). See also 427 U.S. at 498-500, 
nn.1-3. 
72. 427 U.S. at 510. 
73. One observer writes: "In Mathews u. Lucas, the'reasonable level of scrutiny uti- 
lized through the Weber balancing test provided the illegitimate with virtually no more 
protection that [sic] a mere r~tional basis test would have provided." 42 Mo. L. REV. 444, 
451 (1977). 
74. 427 U.S. at 510. 
75. Id. at 516-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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"[Tlhis Court requires, a t  a minimum, that a statutory classifi- 
cation bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state pur- 
pose." In this context, the standard just stated is a minimum; 
the Court sometimes requires more. "Though the latitude 
given state economic and social regulation is necessarily broad, 
when state statutory classifications approach sensitive and fun- 
damental personal rights, this Court exercises a stricter scru- 
tiny . . . ." 
Appellants urge us to hold that classifications based on il- 
legitimacy are "suspect," so that any justifications must sur- 
vive "strict scrutiny." We considered and rejected a similar ar- 
gument last Term in Mathews v. Lucas. As we recognized in 
Lucas, illegitimacy is analogous in many respects to the per- 
sonal characteristics that have been held to be suspect when 
used as the basis of statutory differentiations. We nevertheless 
concluded that the analogy was not sufficient to require "our 
most exacting scrutiny." Despite the conclusion that classifica- 
tions based on illegitimacy fall in a "realm of less than strictest 
scrutiny," Lucas also establishes that the scrutiny "is not a 
toothless one," a proposition clearly demonstrated by our pre- 
vious decisions in this area.'% 
In other words the Court followed this basic approach: although 
illegitimacy is not a suspect category, any law that discriminates 
against illegitimate children will receive a close judicial examina- 
tion, something slightly less than strictest scrutiny, but still 
"stricter scrutiny" than is given state laws dealing with most 
other matters. Having thus defined the applicable standard of 
review, the Court held unconstitutional an Illinois law77 requir- 
ing that the parents of an illegitimate child marry before the 
child could recover under the intestate succession act. 
IV. THE ILLEGITIMACY ISSUE IN THE 1978 TERM 
A. Lalli v. Lalli 
Although all the interested parties agreed that Robert Lalli 
was the son of Mario Lalli,?8 the Supreme Court ruled that Rob- 
ert could not inherit from his father in intestate succession. 
76. 430 U.S. at 766-67 (citations omitted) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Casualty & 
Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 172 (1972); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505, 506, 510 
(1976)). 
77. Probate Act of 1975 $ 2-2, ILL. REV. STAT. ANN. ch. 3, $ 2-2 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 
1978) (original version at Probate Act of 1939 $ 12, 1939 Ill. Laws 8). 
78. Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 277 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
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Mario Lalli had not had his paternity declared by petitioning 
the proper New York court for an order officially recognizing 
that he was Robert's father? Robert claimed that this New 
York state requirement discriminated against him as an illegiti- 
mate child in violation of the equal protection clause.80 Robert's 
argument appeared likely to prevail, considering the trend of the 
Supreme Court from Levy v. Louisiana through Trimble v. 
Gordon. Robert's argument, however, convinced only four of the 
five justices who had joined in striking down the Illinois law in 
Trimble.81 The fifth justice of the Trimble majority, Justice 
Powell, joined the Trimble dissenterse2 and upheld the New 
York statute. The Court reasoned that "a number of problems 
arise that counsel against treating illegitimate children identi- 
cally to all other heirs of an intestate father."8s These same 
"problems" existed in Trimble, and arguably in other illegiti- 
macy cases in which the challenged laws were struck down, but 
in the previous cases the Court did not think that these 
"problems" justified treating illegitimate children differently. 
The Supreme Court's analysis in Lalli essentially followed 
the traditional rational basis approach: "Our inquiry under the 
Equal Protection Clause does not focus on the abstract 'fairness' 
of a state law, but on whether the statute's relation to the state 
interests it is intended to promote is so tenuous that it lacks the 
rationality contemplated by the Fourteenth Amendment."" The 
Court concluded, using this "rationality" test, that the New 
York proof of paternity requirement is "substantially related to 
the important state interests the statute is intended to pro- 
mote."85 This conclusion is difficult to reconcile with Trimble. 
The statute in Trimble was "substantially related" to "impor- 
tant state interests." The flaw in Trimble was that the statute 
did not consider less discriminatory approaches in dealing with 
illegitimacy problems.88 
Justice Powell wrote both the Trimble and Lalli opinions, 
79. Id. at 262. See also note 12 supra. 
80. 439 U.S. at 262. 
81. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, Powell, and Stevens formed the majority in 
Trimble. Justices Brennan, White, Marshall, and Stevens dissented in Lalli. 
82. Chief Justice Burger, and Justices Stewart, Blackmun, and Rehnquist were the 
dipsenters in Trirnble, and along with Justice Powell formed the majority in Lalli. 
83. 439 U.S. at 269. 
84. Id. at 273. 
85. Id. at 275-76. 
86. 430 U.S. at 772. 
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and he tried to distinguish Lalli on the ground that Trimble "ef- 
fected a total statutory disinheritance of children born out of 
wedlock who were not legitimated by the subsequent marriage of 
their pa ren tP7  In Lalli, by contrast, the requirements for legit- 
imating children did not necessitate the marriage of the parents 
but only a court decree of paternity.88 As Justice Brennan's dis- 
sent persuasively pointed out, however, neither the marriage of 
the parents nor a court order of paternity represents a require- 
ment that many illegitimate children will be able to meet? In 
any event, Justice Powell convinced only a plurality of the Court 
that Trimble was distinguishable. Justice Blackmun's concurring 
opinion gave the fifth vote in favor of the judgment, but Justice 
Blackmun disagreed with Justice Powell's reasoning and con- 
tended that the Court could not hold as it did without over- 
ruling Trimble.Bo The four dissenters felt Trimble was 
indistinguishable. 
B. Parham v. Hughes and Califano v. Boles 
Other opinions in the 1978 Term give support to the obser- 
vation that the standard in illegitimacy analysis is moving away 
from the "stricter scrutiny" of Trimble toward greater deference 
to the legislature. In Parharn u. Hughes,@' the Court upheld a 
Georgia statuteBa that required a father to declare paternity 
before the death of his illegitimate child in order to take advan- 
tage of Georgia's wrongful death statute. The dissent by Justice 
White pointed out that the fact situation in Parham was funda- 
mentally the same as that found in Glona, where the Louisiana 
law was struck down.B3 In upholding the Georgia statute, the 
majority opinion correctly observed that the law did not dis- 
criminate directly against illegitimate children vis-a-vis legiti- 
87. 439 U.S. at 273. 
88. N.Y. EST., POWERS & TRUSTS LAW 8 4-1.2 (McKinney 1967). The New York law 
requires that the proceeding requesting the court order of filiation must commence dur- 
ing the pregnancy of the mother or within two years from the birth of the child. The 
Supreme Court did not rule specifically on the constitutionality of this two-year limita- 
tion because the lower court had not reached the issue. 439 U.S. at 267 n.5. Conse- 
quently, all that Lalli specifically held was that requiring court decrees of paternity for 
illegitimate children in intestate succession is not unconstitutional. 
89. 439 U.S. at 278-79 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
90. Id. at 276-77. (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
91. 441 U.S. 347 (1979). 
92. GA. CODE ANN. 8 105-1307 (1975). 
93. 441 US. at 363 (White, J., dissenting). 
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mate children, but actually discriminated between parents of il- 
legitimate children and parents of legitimate children.@' This 
same distinction was present in Glona, but Justice Douglas was 
not deterred there from declaring the Louisiana statute uncon- 
stitutional. Justice Douglas found "no possible rational basis"@5 
to support the law: "Where the claimant is plainly the mother, 
the State denies equal protection of the laws to withhold relief 
merely because the child, wrongfully killed, was born to her out 
of wedlo~k."~ Glona and Parham can be distinguished by the 
fact that it was the illegitimate child's mother trying to recover 
in Glona, whereas the father brought the suit in Parham. The 
Court, however, does not mention this distinction, and the 
Parham opinion merely rests on the ground that the Court did 
find that the statute was rationally related to a permissible state 
objective.@' 
In Califano v. Boles,@8 the Supreme Court sustained the 
portion of the Social Security Act that restricts mothers' insur- 
ance benefits to widows and divorced wives of wage earners." 
The mother of an illegitimate child brought suit contending that 
because she could not receive mothers' benefits, part of which 
she would use for support of the child, the child was being dis- 
criminated against because of its illegitimacy. The Court re- 
sponded that the child received direct benefits as a minor child 
of the deceased,loO and declared incidental any effect on the 
child from mothers' benefits.l0l Justice Marshall's dissent per- 
suasively argued that the absence of mothers' benefits had much 
more than an incidental effect on children.lo2 Justice Marshall 
also stressed that the majority opinion violated principles of 
Weber and Jimenez- Weber because the Court had concluded 
there that "marital status of parents is not a sufficiently accu- 
rate index of the economic needs of their children to warrant 
conclusively denying assistance to  illegitimate^,"^^^ and Jimenez 
because " [t] he constitutional infirmities identified in Jimenez 
94. 441 U.S. at 353. 
95. 391 U.S. at 75. 
96. Id. at 76. 
97. 441 U.S. at 357-58. 
98. 443 U.S. 282 (1979). 
99. 42 U.S.C. 55 402 (g)(l), 416 (d)(3) (1976). See also 443 U.S. at 286 n.5. 
100. 443 U.S. at 294. 
101. Id. at 295. 
102. Id. at 298-301 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
103. Id. at 305. 
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are equally evident in this case . . . ."lo4 These infirmities were 
that the law aided legitimate children who were not in fact de- 
pendent on their deceased parent, and took away aid from ille- 
gitimate children who in fact had depended on their deceased 
parent.lo5 
The history of the illegitimacy cases presents a chain of 
close decisions accompanied by frequent, vigorous dissents. On 
the present Court, Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart 
and Rehnquist generally favor an analysis granting considerable 
deference to illegitimacy statutes.loe Justices Brennan, White, 
and Marshall lean toward a stricter scrutiny of illegitimacy stat- 
utes.lo7 Justices Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens have changed 
their positions during the course of the illegitimacy cases; the 
more recent opinions indicate that Justice Stevens is leaning to- 
ward rational basis deference and Justice Blackmun toward 
stricter scrutiny.lo8 This even division in the present Court 
makes it difficult to predict what may occur in the future. None- 
theless, some basic conclusions can be drawn concerning the Su- 
preme Court's approach to the question of equal protection for 
illegitimates. 
I t  does not appear likely that illegitimacy will join race, na- 
tional origin, and alienage as classifications receiving the Court's 
strictest scrutiny.lO@ On the other hand, illegitimacy statutes are 
not approved according to a mere rational basis standard; estab- 
lished precedent requires a stricter examination of illegitimacy 
issues. Thus illegitimacy does not fit neatly or consistently into 
either of the two tiers of the traditional approach. Sometimes an 
illegitimacy statute is given deference as is done under the ra- 
tional basis test, and sometimes it is more strictly scrutinized. 
104. Id. 
105. Id. at 305-06. 
106. See Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. 259 (1978); Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. at 776-86 
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Especially note Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in 
Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. 282 (1979). 
107. See Califano v. Boles, 443 U.S. at 297-306 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Parham v. 
Hughes, 441 U.S. at 361-68 (White, J., dissenting); Lalli v. Lalli, 439 U.S. at 277-79 
(Brennan, J., dissenting). 
108. Justice Stevens voted with the majority in Califano u. Boles and Parham u. 
Hughes. Justice Blackmun dissented in these same cases. 
109. See note 21 supra. 
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What are the factors that determine which illegitimacy statutes 
are strictly scrutinized and which are not? 
A. Insurmountable Barriers 
One factor present in several cases is the "insurmountable 
barrier" doctrine. This doctrine inquires whether illegitimate 
children are permanently barred from equal treatment or 
whether only minor barriers must be overcome before achieving 
equality with legitimate children. Justice Powell expressly dis- 
paraged insurmountable barriers as an analytical tool in Trimble 
u. Gordon,llo and since the presence or absence of insurmount- 
able barriers does not explain all the cases,"' insurmountable 
barriers can only be part of the reconciliation of the illegitimacy 
issue. However, in the recent case of Lalli u. Lalli, Justice 
Powell seemed to again rely on the insurmountable barrier doc- 
trine to distinguish Lalli from Trimble: 
The Illinois statute in Trimble was constitutionally unaccept- 
able because it effected a total statutory disinheritance of chil- 
dren born out of wedlock who were not legitimated by the sub- 
sequent marriage of their parents. The reach of the statute was 
far in excess of its justifiable purposes. . . . [The New York 
law] does not share this defect. . . . This is not a requirement 
that inevitably disqualifies an unnecessarily large number of 
children born out of wedlock."" 
Thus "insurmountable barriers," or the burden the illegiti- 
mate child must overcome to secure equal treatment, is but one 
of the factors that determines how strict the scrutiny applied to 
an illegitimacy statute will be. Another factor goes much further 
in explaining and reconciling the illegitimacy cases: the presence 
or absence of a moral purpose in the legislation. 
B. Legislative Purpose: The Determinative Factor? 
The starting point of analysis in the illegitimacy cases under 
110. "Despite its appearance in two of our opinions, the focus on the presence or 
absence of an insurmountable barrier is somewhat of an analytical anomaly." 430 US. at 
773. See also notes 56-57 and accompanying text supra. 
111. For example, the insurmountable barrier doctrine cannot explain the differ- 
ences between Labine v. Vincent and Trimble u. Gordon: the barrier for the illegitimate 
child was exactly the same in each case. Both cases involved intestate succession, and the 
barrier to illegitimate children in the intestate succession laws would have been avoided 
in each case by the making of a will, yet the holdings are opposite. 
112. 439 U.S. at 273. 
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the equal protection clause has generally been an examination of 
the objective the statute purports to further: whether it seeks to 
regulate the behavior of the parents by punishing the illegiti- 
mate child, or whether it seeks to facilitate an orderly distribu- 
tion of a decedent's property or a just allocation of benefits 
under family support programs. A review of the illegitimacy 
cases with these possible objectives in mind reveals a definite 
consistent pattern. In every case where the state objective in a 
statute that discriminates against illegitimate children is prima- 
rily the promotion of moral behavior or the condemnation of 
sexual activity outside of marriage, the statute has been declared 
unconstitutional. On the other hand, if the state objective is 
merely to provide for the equitable distribution of property or to 
overcome problems of proof, the statute has been upheld. The 
accuracy of this conclusion can be documented by analyzing the 
nature of the governmental interest in illegitimacy statutes. 
A review of the cases invalidating illegitimacy laws shows a 
definite pattern. In Levy u. Louisiana, the state statute had 
been declared by the state courts to be " 'based on morals and 
general welfare because it discourages bringing children into the 
world out of wedlock.' "119 In Glona v. American Guarantee & 
Liability Insurance Co., the Supreme Court noted that " 'sin' 
. . . is, we are told, the historic reason for the creation of the 
disability."l14 The Court mentioned in Weber v. Aetna Casualty 
& Surety Co. that "[tlhe Louisiana Supreme Court emphasized 
strongly the state's interest in protecting 'legitimate family rela- 
tionships' . . . ."ll6 In New Jersey v. Cahill, the state's objective 
was " 'to preserve and strengthen family life.' "116 In Trimble v. 
Gordon, one of the state's purported interests furthered by the 
statute was " 'the promotion of [legitimate] family relation- 
ships.' "117 Hence, this almost unanimous pattern suggests that 
113. 391 U.S. at 70 (quoting Levy v. State, 192 So. 2d 193, 195 (La. Ct. App. 1966)). 
114. 391 U.S. at 75. 
115. 406 U.S. at 173 (quoting Stokes v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 257 La. 424, 433, 242 
So. 2d 567, 570 (1970)). 
116. 411 U.S. at 620 (quoting New Jersey v. Cahill, 349 F. Supp. 491, 496 (D.N.J. 
1972)). 
117. 430 U.S. at 768 (quoting In re Estate of Karas, 61 111. 2d 40,48,329 N.E.2d 234, 
238 (1975)). The other purpose for the statues was the state's interest in governing the 
intestate succession of property. Id. a t  770. The Supreme Court concluded that the stat- 
ute did not meet this goal because it was too broad; the statute excluded some illegiti- 
mate children unnecessarily. Id. a t  770-72. Thus, encouraging morality was not the sole 
purpose for the statute in Trimble. However, Justice Powell emphasized the presence of 
the "moral" purpose in Trimble when he distinguished Lalli from Trimble. 439 U.S. at 
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if the statute's primary objective in discriminating against ille- 
gitimate~ is merely to encourage morality or discourage promis- 
cuity, the statute will be declared unconstitutional. 
The pattern in cases upholding illegitimacy legislation is 
just as clear. Although strengthening family life was briefly men- 
tioned as a possible state objective for the statute in Labine u. 
Vincent, the Court's holding actually rests on the state's power 
"to make laws for distribution of property left within the 
State."l18 In Mathews v. Lucas, the Court upheld a statute that 
discriminated against illegitimate children, but the Court deter- 
mined that the governmental objective was "to provide for all 
children of deceased insureds who can demonstrate their 'need' 
in terms of dependency at the times of the insureds' deaths."l19 
Any mention of punishing sin or encouraging legitimate family 
relationships was conspicuously absent in Lucas. Similarly, the 
Supreme Court declared in Lalli v. Lalli: "[Tlhe primary state 
goal underlying the challenged aspects of 5 4-1.2 is to provide for 
the just and orderly disposition of property at death."120 The 
lack of any state purpose designed to encourage moral behavior 
is one of the facts the Court accented in distinguishing Lalli 
from Trimble: 
The Illinois law [in Trimble] was defended, in part as a means 
of encouraging family relationships. No such justification has 
been offered in support of 5 4-1.2. The Court of Appeals dis- 
claimed that the purpose of the statute, "even in small part, 
was to discourage illegitimacy, to mold human conduct or to 
set societal norms."181 
In no case upholding a statute permitting discrimination against 
illegitimate children has the state's principal aim been a moral 
condemnation of the parents' illicit ~ 0 n d u c t . l ~ ~  In these cases the 
267-68. 
Many statutes do have multiple aims. The point here, however, is that if one of the 
state's objectives is to minimize promiscuity by treating illegitimates differently, then 
the statute will probably be strictly scrutinized. 
118. 401 U.S. at 539. 
119. 427 U.S. a t  507. 
120. 439 U.S. at 268. 
121. Id. a t  267-68 (quoting In re Lalli, 43 N.Y.2d. 65, 70, 371 N.E.2d 481, 483, 400 
N.Y.S.2d 761, 764 (1977)). 
122. The Court in Parham u. Hughes upheld a statute whose objective was to en- 
courage legitimate family relations, 441 U.S. at 350, but that case does not weaken the 
stated conclusion. The statute in Parham did not punish illegitimate children for the 
infidelity of their parents; rather it only denied fathers of illegitimate children the right 
to sue for the wrongul death of their child. The Court declared: "It is thus neither illogi- 
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Court usually emphasizes the nonmoral, property, or administra- 
tive purposes of the statute. 
What does this conclusion mean for the illegitimacy prob- 
lem in particular, and also for the broader issue of equal protec- 
tion analysis? First, Justice Blackmun's assertion in his concur- 
ring opinion in Lalli that the courts had not given guidance to 
the states, and that each law will have to be judicially deter- 
mined to be on either the Lalli or the Trimble side of the line123 
was not entirely accurate. Justice Blackmun was correct in stat- 
ing that the courts have not given the states explicit guidance, 
but the pattern of history tells drafters of state or federal stat- 
utes that illegitimates can only be treated differently vis-a-vis 
legitimate children for purposes unrelated to the moral objective 
of discouraging illicit sexual behavior. Possible proper motives 
have been previously suggested. 
This is not to suggest that a statute whose real purpose is to 
discriminate against illegitimate children for moral reasons will 
be upheld under the guise of a stated "proper" purpose. The 
courts will undoubtedly see through such a sham and deal with 
the real purpose. The government will have the burden of dem- 
onstrating a legitimate objective unrelated to the morality of the 
parents. If the government is successful in carrying its burden, 
the statute will be afforded some deference, rather than being 
subjected to strict scrutiny. 
In addition to giving some guidance for future cases, the ob- 
servation that the nature of the state objective is determinative 
in illegitimacy cases also lends insight into the present Supreme 
Court approach to equal protection. It was noted earlier that 
some observers contend that the Court is applying a type of bal- 
ancing test in equal protection cases. It is beyond the scope of 
this Comment to study in depth the merits and functions of 
such a balancing test; however, some general observations based 
on the limited scope of the illegitimacy cases can be offered. 
Too often the issue of what constitutional standard is used 
is resolved merely by stating that a balancing test or a sliding 
scde is used. These labels are of limited value. To tell a legisla- 
tive drafting committee or a client that the Court applies a slid- 
ing scale approach will not significantly aid the committee in de- 
cal nor unjust for society to express its 'condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond 
the bonds of marriage' by not conferring upon a biological father the statutory right to 
sue for the wrongful death of this illegitimate child." Id. at 353. 
123. See 439 US. at 277 (Blackmun, J., concurring). 
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ciding how to draft a statute or the client in deciding whether to 
incur the expense of contesting an alleged discriminatory prac- 
tice. Interested parties need to know the controlling principles 
likely to influence the Court's decision in order to assess their 
reasonable chances of success. This information depends on 
what factors the Court weighs in its balancing test or what slides 
the scale in the sliding scale approach. 
In the illegitimacy area the nature of the legislative objec- 
tive appears to be the determining factor in the Court's balanc- 
ing test. Despite the cogency of this conclusion, it remains tenta- 
tive since it was formulated from a case-by-case comparison of 
the Court's holdings, and cannot presently be grounded in the 
express declarations of the Supreme Court. Thus, if the Su- 
preme Court intends to continue using a balancing test in illegit- 
imacy cases or in other areas, and desires to clarify the current 
state of the law, the Court must specify what particular factors 
will predominate in the balancing process. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court has vacillated in its approach to the 
problem of equal protection for illegitimate children. In some 
cases, laws discriminating against illegitimate children have been 
strictly scrutinized. In other cases, somewhat similar laws have 
been treated with greater deference. The present Court's even 
division on this issue makes the future of the illegitimacy issue 
uncertain. The analytical approach of the Court is characterized 
by the lack of a strict rule: the Court weighs the competing in- 
terests and applies differing degrees of judicial scrutiny in differ- 
ent cases. The factor that apparently triggers stricter scrutiny is 
whether the challenged statute attempts to condemn the prac- 
tice of having illegitimate children by discriminating against the 
child. The Supreme Court has declared: "[Ilt is unjust and inef- 
fective for society to express its condemnation of procreation 
outside the marital relationship by punishing the illegitimate 
child who is in no way responsible for his situation and is unable 
to change it."124 On the other hand, if a statute's primary pur- 
pose in discriminating against illegitimate children is unrelated 
to moral condemnation of illegitimacy, the statute will likely 
124. Parham v. Hughes, 441 U.S. at 352. 
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survive an equal protection challenge. 
Scott E. Isaacson 
